Toulmin

Toulmin first defines the terms substantial and analytic arguments. Substantial arguments are evaluated on content while analytic arguments are evaluated by form. "Analytic arguments base their claim on unchanging and universal principles...substantial arguments ground their claims in the context of a particular situation rather than in abstract, universal principles" (120). He uses the distinction between these two to define the distinction between theoretical and practical arguments. Toulmin says that practical and sunstantial arguments are similar, and can be used in everyday situations and decisions.
Toulmin's attempt was to "emancipate people from the the domination of theoretical argument" (121). He believed this domination came from the fact that philosophy made little progress and it settled on an absolutist, theoretical approach. Toulimin's approach to arrgumentation assumes the irrelevence of theoretical argument in making everyday decisions(123). Toulmin says that "the prototypical example of theoretical argument is the syllogism, a method of reasoning that produces absolute knowledge from the combination of two premises," which are a major and minor premis (123). Because "formal logic assumes that arguments never change regardless of their subject matter," then it cannot be used to determine the outcomes of everyday decisions. "Practical concerns are rarely governed by a single overriding principle" (124). This absolutists approach to everyday problems also falters in that many of these problems are probably or maybe a certain way rather than absolutely that way.
Toulmin is not trying to completely rid of the uses of analytic logic altogether, he just feels that the range that it had been covering should be more narrow. This type of argument was beleived to be the correct form for all situations, yet Toulmin says that is not the case. He suggests an alternative which is relativism. Anthropology is field that uses relativistic argument, becasue they see that arguments vary between cultures. However, Toulmin is not suggesting that it must be completely absolutist or completely relativistic. He maintains that it can be a balance between the two. (126-127)
To define the emancipation of the practical argument, Toulmin defines three kinds of properties. The three properties are: simple, complex, and scientific qualities. With this argument he is claiming that values are not directly perceived properties. His second approach is with sunjective arguments and the beleif that by saying something is good or right, then that is our feelings toward it. The third approach is the imperative which states that saying something is good or right, we are displaying out feelings. For example, to say lying is bad is the same as telling someone not to lie (128-129). As an alternative, Toulmin offers the good reasons approach to ethics (129).
Toulmin developed a model, or layout for the practical argument. Because practical arguments justify a claim, they must include aspects that back that claim. Toulmin defines this by stating the differences between good and bad arguments. Good arguments have a claim, a grounds for that claim, and a warrant. A refined version of this has six elements which include gorunds, backing, warrant, modality, claim, and rebuttal (131-133).
Toulmin also describes the idea of conceptual change. Toulmin beleives that "conceptual change is evolutionaryand not revolutionary" (134). Toulmin beleives "concepts develop through according to pattern of evolution much the same way that organisms evolve biologically" (134).
Toulmin beleives that rationality id the median between relativism and absolutism. There is a similar answer for the question of moral ethics. Causitry, case ethics, is this answer. Toulmin defines causitry as a way to solves moral problems without using theoretical arguments. Toulmin and his pratner Jonsen offer a model for causitry in a practical argument. The model contains grounds, general warrant, claim, and rebuttal. (136-139).
Toulmin concludes with his hopes not only for the emancipation of the practical, but also the humanizing of modernity. (140).